Alexander W. Salter

Senior Fellow, Sound Money Project

Alexander William Salter is the Georgie G. Snyder Associate Professor of Economics in the Rawls College of Business and the Comparative Economics Research Fellow with the Free Market Institute, both at Texas Tech University. He is a co-author of Money and the Rule of Law: Generality and Predictability in Monetary Institutions, published by Cambridge University Press. In addition to his numerous scholarly articles, he has published nearly 300 opinion pieces in leading national outlets such as the Wall Street Journal, National Review, Fox News Opinion, and The Hill.

Salter earned his M.A. and Ph.D. in Economics at George Mason University and his B.A. in Economics at Occidental College. He was an AIER Summer Fellowship Program participant in 2011.

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Articles

6/13/19

Fiscal Profligacy: A Failure of Congress and the People

Almost everybody likes receiving services from the government. Almost nobody likes paying for them.

6/5/19

Monetary Policy and Constrained Discretion

The problem with constrained discretion is that it leaves up to central bankers the decision when to switch from rule-like behavior to discretionary behavior.

5/12/19

Monetary Policy Rules Are Not Enough

A monetary rule would provide guidance and stability. But monetary rules are not incentive-compatible for monetary policy makers.

4/3/19

Interest Rates, Funny Money, and Economic Malaise

There is growing support for the idea that meddling with market interest rates is a bad idea. Interest rates coordinate intertemporal production plans, and any attempt to alter them will entail undesirable unintended consequences.

3/12/19

The Federal Reserve: A Failure of the Rule of Law

The Fed has a monopoly on the creation of base money, the fundamental asset underlying the banking and financial system. And over decades, with each instance of financial turbulence, the Fed has become less constrained in how, when, and why it creates base money.

2/12/19

A Failure to Communicate

Central banking should be boring. Surprises in the stance of monetary policy are almost always a bad thing. The best thing a central bank can do to achieve macroeconomic stability is to be very open about its future intended policies.

1/9/19

The Fed is Hostile to a Self-Governing Society

While it is appropriate for monetary policy to be removed from active political interference, it does not follow that monetary policy ought not be judged according to democratic standards.

11/18/18

Free Societies Don’t Need the Fed’s Managers

The public discourse concerning the state of the financial system that once took place in trade associations and committees of concerned citizens has disappeared, replaced by a cold and sterile managerialism practiced by an insular and self-perpetuating macroeconomic elite.

10/30/18

The Adaptive Value of Monetary Technocracy

When considering why central bankers do what they do, we often focus on their intentions or motivations. Instead, we should look for patterns of behavior that have adaptive value within the context central banking.

10/24/18

Did Bernanke’s Fed Follow Bagehot’s Rules?

Bagehot’s rules are ultimately geared toward assisting illiquid financial organizations but allowing insolvent ones to fail. The Fed went out of its way to support insolvent organizations.

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